


# BGP Tutorial (bgp.tools)

Ben Cartwright-Cox - RIPE 90 (2025)



# Quick overview of bgp.tools

[Login](#)

## Browse the Internet ecosystem

Search by ASN (AS13335), Prefix (8.8.0/24), DNS (bgp.tools), or MAC Address (3c:ec:ef:6f:8d:75)

[Jump to Looking Glass](#)

### You are connecting from

- IPv6: [2a0b:f4c2:3::85](#)
- Stiftung Erneuerbare Freiheit ([AS60729](#))
- [2a0b:f4c2::/40](#)
- IPv4: [185.220.101.85](#)
- Stiftung Erneuerbare Freiheit ([AS60729](#))
- [185.220.101.0/24](#)
- DNS: [217.197.80.4](#)
- DNS: [2001:67c:1400:1010::4](#)

- [Cloudflare \(AS13335\)](#)
- [LINX LON1](#)
- [Google DNS Prefix](#)

### Recent Updates

- [March 2025 Changelog](#)
- [February 2025 Changelog](#)
- [December 2024 Changelog](#)
- [October 2024 Changelog](#)
- [September 2024 Changelog](#)

### Latency to bgp.tools

- IPv4 End To End: 191.8ms
- IPv4 TCP Stack: 20.9ms [+-13.7ms]
- IPv4 [TCP MSS](#): 1460b
- IPv6 End To End: 176ms
- IPv6 TCP Stack: 21.6ms [+-0.1ms]

### Why use BGP.Tools?

#### We offer for free:

- Near Realtime BGP Data
- User Friendly interfaces
- [Frequently updated external data](#)

#### We offer for paid users:

- [BGP Network Monitoring](#)
- [IRR Database Monitoring](#)

bgp.tools Start here. →

Logged in as AS206924

View Edit Looking Glass Core



## NOS COMUNICACOES, S.A.

AS Number [2860](#)  
Website <http://www.nos.pt>

Overview Prefixes Connectivity Whois IX

Registered on  
25 Sep 2002 (22 years old)

Registered to  
[pt.nos \(ripe\)](#)

Network status  
Active, Allocated under RIPE

Network type  
Eyeball

Prefixes Originated  
127 IPv4, 4 IPv6

### Upstreams

- [AS174](#) - Cogent Communications
- [AS6453](#) - TATA Communications (America) Inc
- [AS3320](#) - Deutsche Telekom AG

### Rankings

- #3 for [AS Cone in Portugal](#)
- #1 for [Estimated Eyeballs in Portugal](#)
- #11 for [Unique Domains in Portugal](#)
- #6 for [Known Peers in Portugal](#)
- #2 for [Originated IPv4 Space in Portugal](#)
- #3 for [Originated IPv6 Space in Portugal](#)


### Tags:

[Home ISP](#) [Mobile Data/Carrier](#)

[Validating RPKI ROV](#)

# Global Looking Glass

```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[13:55:39] ben@metropolis:~$ ssh bgp.tools
Welcome This session is supported by:

 bgp.tools

bgp.tools> show route 2620:121::/44 match 206924
2620:121::/44 unicast [{AS206924 - Ben Cartwright-C...} Mythic CBG 000]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 206924 44684 6461 55219
BGP.community: (65532,400) [AS206924: Learned from Transit]
BGP.large_community: (44684, 0, 700) [AS44684: Route learned from peer] (44684, 2, 6461) [AS44684: Route learned at Digital Reality Sovereign House / SOV] (44684, 2, 6461) [AS44684: Route learned from LONAP / London Network Access Point] (44684, 3, 53) [AS44684: Route learned from LONAP / London Network Access Point]
unicast [{AS206924 - Ben Cartwright-C...} Mythic CBG 000]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 206924 44684 6461 55219
BGP.community: (65532,400) [AS206924: Learned from Transit]
```

\$ ssh anyuser@bgp.tools

Web UI Terminal UI

## Query all public BGP sessions connected to bgp.tools

Lookup by CIDR, only applies to sessions that have been marked to be exported publicly

185.230.223.0/24 →


Search Filters:

Must Contain ASN: 65000

---

Query Overview:

**322 Sessions Responded**  
**451 Matching Paths Displayed**

Supported by: 

185.230.223.0/24 unicast [AS35487 - edge-ng-los01 0000-00-00] \* (?/-) [AS206924]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 35487 8849 5511 206924

BGP.community: (56630,3000) (56630,3057) (57695,13000)

unicast [AS1003 - TORv4 0000-00-00] \* (?/-) [AS206924]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 1003 835 174 5511 206924

BGP.community: [AS174: Route is learned from EU (Europe) non-customer.] [AS174: United Kingdom] [AS835: Source: Cogent Transit] (1003,1200) (1003,1201) (62513,10000)


BGP.large\_community: (206924, 666, 0) (206924, 5511, 0)

unicast [AS34979 - 390-TEL-02 0000-00-00] \* (?/-) [AS206924]

Type: BGP

<https://bgp.tools/super-lg>

# ASN Info



## NOS COMUNICACOES, S.A.

AS Number 2860

Website <http://www.nos.pt>

Overview Prefixes Connectivity Whois IX

### Peers

90

### Upstreams

3


### Downstreams

42 (Cone: 44)

## Network Policy

[Click here to learn more about what this graph means and what makes up a network policy](#)







### Global Aggregation



► Chart Display Options

[How are upstreams and downstreams calculated?](#)










## Upstreams

ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6
  <a href="#">AS174</a>	Cogent Communications	✓	✓
  <a href="#">AS6453</a>	TATA Communications (America) Inc	✓	✓
  <a href="#">AS3320</a>	Deutsche Telekom AG	✓	✓


## Peers

ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6
 <a href="#">AS174</a>	Cogent Communications	✓	✓
 <a href="#">AS6453</a>	TATA Communications (America) Inc	✓	✓

## Downstreams

ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6
  <a href="#">AS59787</a>	WebSP - Comercio e Prestacao de Servicos Informaticos, Lda	✓	✓
  <a href="#">AS15457</a>	NOS Madeira Comunicacoes, S.A.	✓	✓
  <a href="#">AS25060</a>	Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, I.P.	✓	x
  <a href="#">AS1897</a>	NOS COMUNICACOES, S.A.	✓	x
  <a href="#">AS201523</a>	FDP S.A.	✓	x

# ASN Info



- How many unique AS'es have been seen "next" to the ASN in question
- How many unique AS'es appear to be providing wider internet connectivity to this ASN
- How many unique AS'es appear to be getting connectivity directly **from** this ASN
- How many unique AS'es appear to be getting connectivity directly **via** this ASN

# How does that even work???

- bgp.tools at its core is a very large collector of BGP data
- bgp.tools sees 2500~ views of the internet (2.5 Billion routes~)
- Using parts of logic we can turn BGP paths like this into educated guesses:

```
-----  
| 165.204.156.0/23    unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]  
|   Type: BGP  
|   BGP.as_path: 37721 13335 33619  
|                   unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]  
|   Type: BGP  
|   BGP.as_path: 26073 174 13335 33619  
|                   unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]  
|   Type: BGP  
|   BGP.as_path: 206236 9136 13335 33619  
|-----
```

```
165.204.156.0/23      unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 37721 13335 33619
                        unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 26073 174 13335 33619
                        unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 206236 9136 13335 33619
```

- What can we learn from these routes?

```
165.204.156.0/23 unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 37721 13335 33619
                unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 26073 174 13335 33619
                unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 206236 9136 13335 33619
```

- Every ASN interaction is a peer
  - 37721<->13335
  - 13335<->33619
  - 26073<->174
  - 174<->13335
  - 206236<->9136
  - 9136<->13335



```
165.204.156.0/23 unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 37721 13335 33619
                unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 26073 174 13335 33619
                unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 206236 9136 13335 33619
```

- Paths that go via a "tier 1" network are likely upstream relationships
  - 174 <- 13335
  - 174 is Cogent, a Tier 1
  - 13335 is Cloudflare
  - Cloudflare is likely paying Cogent to carry traffic for them
  - 174 <- 13335 <- 33619
  - 33619 is AMD, AMD is likely paying cloudflare to carry traffic, because cloudflare is giving AMD routes via them, to cogent

```
165.204.156.0/23 unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 37721 13335 33619
                unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 26073 174 13335 33619
                unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]
Type: BGP
BGP.as_path: 206236 9136 13335 33619
```

- Inverse upstream logic happens for downstream
  - 174 <- 13335 <- 33619
  - 33619 is AMD, AMD is likely paying cloudflare to carry traffic, because cloudflare is giving AMD routes via them, to cogent
  - So 33619 is a downstream of 13335

165.204.156.0/23      unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 37721 ↔ 13335 ↔ 33619

unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 26073 ↔ 174 ↔ 13335 ↔ 33619

unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]



Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 206236 ↔ 9136 ↔ 13335 ↔ 33619

↕ Peer

165.204.156.0/23      unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 37721  13335  33619

unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP


BGP.as\_path: 26073  174  13335  33619

unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 206236  9136  13335  33619

 Peer

 Upstream /  
Downstream

165.204.156.0/23      unicast [AS37721 - ACC1-4 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 37721 13335 33619

unicast [AS26073 - r2-ewr01 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP


BGP.as\_path: 26073 174 13335 33619

unicast [AS206236 - r01 0000-00-00]

Type: BGP

BGP.as\_path: 206236 9136 13335 33619





# NOS COMUNICACOES, S.A.

AS Number **2860**

Website <http://www.nos.pt>

Overview

Prefixes

Connectivity

Whois

IX

Peers


**90**

Upstreams

**3**

Downstreams

**42 (Cone: 44)**



# NOS COMUNICACOES, S.A.

AS Number 2860

Website <http://www.nos.pt>

Overview

Prefixes

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90

Upstreams

3


Downstreams

42 (Cone: 44)

## Network Policy


[Click here to learn more about what this graph means and what makes up a network policy](#)

### Global Aggregation



► Chart Display Options

[How are upstreams and downstreams calculated?](#)



BGP Routes  
flow this way

Traffic flows  
this way  
(To the AS)




# Why is this data processing useful?

- bgp.tools calculates Upstream/Downstreams continuously (and in near real time), This is useful for
  - Validating your config changes
    - For example, After disabling a customer/provider link, when should you shut the link?
  - Detecting unintended routing
    - For example, Someone upstreams you without your consent (Route Leaks/Hijacks)
  - Keeping an eye on what your customers or competitors are doing
    - Have they added new customers?
    - Are your customers adding new upstreams?
- While you can see ***your*** own view of the internet on your own network, bgp.tools can show you how the internet ***sees your network***

# Example Situation: Route Leak

**DIGI ROMANIA S.A.**

AS Number **8708**  
Website <https://www.digi.ro>



Overview

Prefixes













Connectivity

Whois

IX

**Prefixes Originated**  
**132 IPv4, 6 IPv6**  
[Show Low Visibility Prefixes](#)

**Addresses Originated**  
**7491 /24's of IPv4**  
**1114112 /48's of IPv6**











	Prefix	Description
 	<a href="#">2.17.116.0/22</a>	Akamai International B.V.
 	<a href="#">5.2.128.0/17</a>	DIGI ROMANIA S.A.
 	<a href="#">5.12.0.0/14</a>	DIGI ROMANIA S.A.
 	<a href="#">45.67.37.0/24</a>	INSX CLOUD SRL
 	<a href="#">46.102.175.0/24</a>	IPv4 Management SRL
 	<a href="#">62.231.64.0/18</a>	DIGI ROMANIA S.A.

# Examp

Overview	Prefixes	Connectivity	Whois	IX
<u>Peers</u>		<u>Upstreams</u>	<u>Downstreams</u>	
1386		7	101 ( <u>Cone: 179</u> )	

[How are upstreams and downstreams calculated?](#)

## Upstreams ⚡















	ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6
 	<a href="#">AS1299</a>	Arelion (fka. Telia Carrier)	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS6762</a>	Telecom Italia Sparkle (Seabone)	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS9002</a>	RETN Limited	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS5511</a>	Orange S.A.	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS41494</a>	Asociația InterLAN	✓	✗
 	<a href="#">AS5606</a>	GTS Telecom SRL	✓	✗
 	<a href="#">AS201387</a>	Luxoft Professional Romania S.R.L.	✓	✗

# Examp

Overview	Prefixes	Connectivity	Whois	IX
<u>Peers</u>	<u>Upstreams</u>		<u>Downstreams</u>	
1386	7		101 ( <b>Cone: 179</b> )	

[How are upstreams and downstreams calculated?](#)


## Upstreams ⚡

	ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6
 	<a href="#">AS1299</a>	Arelion (fka. Telia Carrier)	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS6762</a>	Telecom Italia Sparkle (Seabone)	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS9002</a>	RETN Limited	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS5511</a>	Orange S.A.	✓	✓
 	<a href="#">AS41494</a>	Asociația InterLAN	✓	✗
 	<a href="#">AS5606</a>	GTS Telecom SRL	✓	✗
 	<a href="#">AS201387</a>	Luxoft Professional Romania S.R.L.	✓	✗



# Example Situation: Route Leak






- Looks like a route leak!
- This looks (to me) unintentional



## View

This page shows *some* of the BGP AS paths (and their prefix) that bgp.tools uses to learn that AS5606 (GTS Telecom SRL) is a upstream of AS8953 (Orange Romania S.A.).

This list is not exhaustive, and some paths might have been hidden due to the data feeds being non-exportable.

Prefix	BGP Path
<a href="#">45.67.116.0/24</a>	 <a href="#">AS329095</a>  <a href="#">AS174</a>  <a href="#">AS50084</a>  <a href="#">AS5606</a>  <a href="#">AS8953</a>  <a href="#">AS25454</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a> 
	<a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>
<a href="#">185.223.170.0/23</a>	 <a href="#">AS52025</a>  <a href="#">AS174</a>  <a href="#">AS50084</a>  <a href="#">AS5606</a>  <a href="#">AS8953</a>  <a href="#">AS25454</a>  <a href="#">AS15836</a>  <a href="#">AS15836</a> 
	<a href="#">AS15836</a>  <a href="#">AS15836</a>  <a href="#">AS56491</a>
<a href="#">185.223.168.0/23</a>	 <a href="#">AS40092</a>  <a href="#">AS174</a>  <a href="#">AS50084</a>  <a href="#">AS5606</a>  <a href="#">AS8953</a>  <a href="#">AS25454</a>  <a href="#">AS15836</a>  <a href="#">AS15836</a> 
	<a href="#">AS15836</a>  <a href="#">AS15836</a>  <a href="#">AS56491</a>  <a href="#">AS56491</a>  <a href="#">AS56491</a>  <a href="#">AS56491</a>
<a href="#">45.67.116.0/24</a>	 <a href="#">AS201217</a>  <a href="#">AS131657</a>  <a href="#">AS174</a>  <a href="#">AS50084</a>  <a href="#">AS5606</a>  <a href="#">AS8953</a>  <a href="#">AS25454</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a> 
	<a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>
<a href="#">45.67.116.0/24</a>	 <a href="#">AS51095</a>  <a href="#">AS174</a>  <a href="#">AS50084</a>  <a href="#">AS5606</a>  <a href="#">AS8953</a>  <a href="#">AS25454</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a> 
	<a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>
	 <a href="#">AS7225</a>  <a href="#">AS174</a>  <a href="#">AS50084</a>  <a href="#">AS5606</a>  <a href="#">AS8953</a>  <a href="#">AS25454</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a>  <a href="#">AS43818</a> 

# Route Leaks in this context are

- A peer learning your route from somewhere (or directly from you peering session) and exporting that as if you are a customer of them (aka, they send it to all or some of their upstreams/peers)
- While this sounds good (woo! Free Bandwidth!!) there are a few issues
  - The data path may not actually work
  - The upstreams/peers they may be leaking you to maybe be in very suboptimal places
  - The leak is attracting so much traffic it is making your customers performance very bad
- You typically do not want to ignore route leaks, even if it might mean "free" bandwidth

# Route Leaks are often caused by static prefix lists

- A common (but dangerous) way to configure your export BGP filters is:
  - "Well I know all of my customer prefixes"
  - "So If I see one of those prefixes, we will export them to transit/peers"



# Route Leaks are often caused by static prefix lists

- A common (but dangerous) way to configure your export BGP filters is:
  - "Well I know all of my customer prefixes"
  - "So If I see one of those prefixes, we will export them to transit/peers"
- No! Bad!!!

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- What if?
  - You don't update this list (or your automation breaks to update this list)

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  - You learn your (now) ex-customer prefix from your competitor via peering

# Route Leaks are often caused by static prefix lists

- A common (but dangerous) way to configure your export BGP filters is:
  - "Well I know all of my customer prefixes"
  - "So If I see one of those prefixes, we will export them to transit/peers"
- No! Bad!!!
- What if?
  - You don't update this list (or your automation breaks to update this list)
  - Your customer leaves you
  - You learn your (now) ex-customer prefix from your competitor via peering
  - You are going to give your competitor free transit via peering
  - Also you are likely going to upset both your competitor and ex-customer even more

Non ASN level tooling


# Prefix Data (+DNS)

Overview	Connectivity	Whois	DNS	Validation
Show Forward DNS				
A	DNS			
198.148.78.23	avapdproxy-01prd.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.78.82	confluence.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.78.217	avavpn02.vrt.sourcefire.com, avavpn.vrt.sourcefire.com (3 total...)			
198.148.79.54	clamav.net			
198.148.79.55	updates.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.79.58	intelligence.sourcefire.com			
198.148.79.63	jira.talos.cisco.com, jira.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.79.67	snapshot.clamav.net, www.snapshot.clamav.net			


## 2620:121::/44


Originated by [AS55219](#)  
AS Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.

Overview	Connectivity	Whois	DNS
Validation			

AAAA	DNS
2620:121:0:23::77	regsvc.sco.cisco.com
2620:121:0:500::217	scavpn.vrt.sourcefire.com, v
 2620:121:1:59:250:56ff:fe96:bb7a	stage.regsvc.sco.cisco.com
2620:121:1:500::225	cilvpn.vrt.sourcefire.com
2620:121:4:500::217	dtxvpn.vrt.sourcefire.com

Last Update: 2023-08-31T08:25:15Z UTC


 bgp.tools


Start here... 

Logged in as AS206924

View

Super LG





## 198.148.78.0/23

Originated by [AS55219](#)  
AS Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.

Overview	Connectivity	Whois	DNS
Validation			

Registered on  
9 May 2013 (10  
years old)

Registered to  
[ARIN-CS-985](#) (ARIN)

# Prefix Data (+DNS)


Overview	Connectivity	Whois	DNS	Validation
Show Forward DNS				
A	DNS			
198.148.78.23	avapdproxy-01prd.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.78.82	confluence.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.78.217	avavpn02.vrt.sourcefire.com, avavpn.vrt.sourcefire.com (3 total...)			
198.148.79.54	clamav.net			
198.148.79.55	updates.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.79.58	intelligence.sourcefire.com			
198.148.79.63	jira.talos.cisco.com, jira.vrt.sourcefire.com			
198.148.79.67	snapshot.clamav.net, www.snapshot.clamav.net			

- Useful for:
- Figuring out what a IP address might contain
  - Investigating/Due-Diligence potential customers


## 2620:121::/44


Originated by [AS55219](#)  
AS Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.

Overview	Connectivity	Whois	DNS
Validation			

AAAA	DNS
2620:121:0:23::77	regsvc.sco.cisco.com
2620:121:0:500::217	scavpn.vrt.sourcefire.com, v
 2620:121:1:59:250:56ff:fe96:bb7a	stage.regsvc.sco.cisco.com
2620:121:1:500::225	cilvpn.vrt.sourcefire.com
2620:121:4:500::217	dtxvpn.vrt.sourcefire.com

Last Update: 2023-08-31T08:25:15Z UTC


 bgp.tools


Start here... 

Logged in as AS206924

View

Super LG





## 198.148.78.0/23

Originated by [AS55219](#)  
AS Name: Cisco Systems, Inc.

Overview	Connectivity	Whois	DNS
Validation			

Registered on  
9 May 2013 (10 years old)

Registered to  
[ARIN-CS-985](#) (ARIN)

# Network Ranking

<https://bgp.tools/rankings/MX?sort=cone>



bgp.tools

Start here...



AS206924

## Rankings

### Mexico Network Rankings

Sort by: AS Cone

Sort by: Adjacencies

Sort by: AS Cone






Sort by: Estimated Eyeball

Sort by: Uniq Domains Hosted

Sort by: IPv4 Space Originated

Sort by: IPv6 Space Originated

- #2 for AS Cone in Mexico
- #15 for Estimated Eyeballs in Mexico
- #5 for Unique Domains in Mexico
- #3 for Known Peers in Mexico
- #4 for Originated IPv4 Space in Mexico
- #3 for Originated IPv6 Space in Mexico

	<a href="#">AS8151</a>	UNINET	#3 (85)	#3 (85)	#1	#
	<a href="#">AS19332</a>	Marcatel Com, S.A. de C.V.	#7 (42)	#4 (65)	#43	#
	<a href="#">AS13999</a>	Mega Cable, S.A. de C.V.	#6 (50)	#5 (49)	#3	#
	<a href="#">AS17072</a>	TOTAL PLAY TELECOMUNICACIONES SA DE CV	#5 (78)	#6 (44)	#2	#
	<a href="#">AS7438</a>	Pegaso PCS, S.A. de C.V.	#10 (23)	#7 (25)	#16	#



# Network Ranking






<https://bgp.tools/rankings/MX?sort=cone>

bgp.tools Start here... → AS206924

## Mexico Network Rankings

Sort by: AS Cone

- Sort by: Adjacencies
- Sort by: AS Cone
- Sort by: Estimated Eyeball
- Sort by: Uniq Domains Hosted
- Sort by: IPv4 Space Originated
- Sort by: IPv6 Space Originated

 <a href="#">AS8151</a>	UNINET	#3 (85)	#3 (85)	#1	#
 <a href="#">AS19332</a>	Marcatel Com, S.A. de C.V.	#7 (42)	#4 (65)	#43	#
 <a href="#">AS13999</a>	Mega Cable, S.A. de C.V.	#6 (50)	#5 (49)	#3	#
 <a href="#">AS17072</a>	TOTAL PLAY TELECOMUNICACIONES SA DE CV	#5 (78)	#6 (44)	#2	#
 <a href="#">AS7438</a>	Pegaso PCS, S.A. de C.V.	#10 (23)	#7 (25)	#16	#

Can be ranked by Global or ASN Country using:

- Peer Count (\*)
- AS Cone
- Eyeball Population
- Domain Records
- IPv4/IPv6 space originated

\* is improved by feeding bgp.tools BGP data

# IXP Info Pages

## NYIIX New York

 [Go to PeeringDB page](#)

 [Go to IXP-DB page](#)

### Data Feeds Available:

☒ RS Feed, ☒ Ping, ☒ MAC Address

Do you run this IX and want to help with feeds? [Contact Us!](#)

List of members (236 routers over 211 ASNs):

ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6
 <a href="#">AS45437</a>	Real World - The Core	198.32.161.115	2001:504:1::a504
 <a href="#">AS52772</a>	SJNET TELECOMUNICACOES - EIRELI	198.32.161.89	2001:504:1::a526
 <a href="#">AS53180</a>	INFORTEL COMUNICACOES LTDA	198.32.161.51	2001:504:1::a509
 <a href="#">AS41327</a>	Fiber Telecom S.p.A.	198.32.161.50	2001:504:1::a504
 <a href="#">AS53667</a>	FranTech Solutions	198.32.161.45	2001:504:1::a509
 <a href="#">AS1031</a>	Peer 1 Internet Service LLC	198.32.161.44	2001:504:1::a500
 <a href="#">AS271253</a>	LINK BRASIL TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA	198.32.161.43	2001:504:1::a527
 <a href="#">AS2734</a>	CoreSite	198.32.161.41	2001:504:1::a500

## PIT-IX

 [Go to PeeringDB page](#)

 [Go to IXP-DB page](#)

Route Server ASN: [AS30365](#)

### Data Feeds Available:

☒ RS Feed, ☒ Ping, ☒ MAC Address

### Top Vendors

Vendor	%
 Cisco Systems, Inc	28%
 Juniper Networks	15%
 Arista Networks	12%
 Edgecore Networks Corporation	5%
 Other	15%

List of members (39 routers over 31 ASNs):

ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6	Speed
   <a href="#">AS400798</a>	Pittsburgh Internet Exchange	206.71.141.6	2001:504:77::6	100 gbps
   <a href="#">AS400798</a>	Pittsburgh Internet Exchange	206.71.141.7	2001:504:77::7	100 gbps
  <a href="#">AS212232</a>	bgp.tools Route Collector	206.71.141.9	2001:504:77::9	10 gbps
   <a href="#">AS20326</a>	TeraSwitch Networks Inc.	206.71.141.10	2001:504:77::10	100 gbps
   <a href="#">AS13335</a>	Cloudflare, Inc	206.71.141.11	2001:504:77::11	10 gbps

# IXP Info Pages

## NYIIX New York

 [Go to PeeringDB page](#)









 [Go to IXP-DB page](#)

### Data Feeds Available:

☒ RS Feed, ☒ Ping, ☒ MAC Address

Do you run this IX and want to help with feeds? [Contact Us!](#)

List of members (236 routers over 211 ASNs):

ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6
 <a href="#">AS45437</a>	Real World - The Core	198.32.161.115	2001:504:1::a504
 <a href="#">AS52772</a>	SJNET TELECOMUNICACOES - EIRELI	198.32.161.89	2001:504:1::a526
 <a href="#">AS53180</a>	INFOTEL COMUNICACOES LTDA	198.32.161.51	2001:504:1::a509
 <a href="#">AS41327</a>	Fiber Telecom S.p.A.	198.32.161.50	2001:504:1::a504
 <a href="#">AS53667</a>	FranTech Solutions	198.32.161.45	2001:504:1::a509
 <a href="#">AS1031</a>	Peer 1 Internet Service LLC	198.32.161.44	2001:504:1::a500
 <a href="#">AS271253</a>	LINK BRASIL TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA	198.32.161.43	2001:504:1::a527
 <a href="#">AS2734</a>	CoreSite	198.32.161.41	2001:504:1::a500

## PIT-IX

 [Go to PeeringDB page](#)

 [Go to IXP-DB page](#)

Route Server ASN: [AS30365](#)

### Data Feeds Available:















☒ RS Feed, ☒ Ping, ☒ MAC Address

### Top Vendors

Vendor
 Cisco Systems, Inc
 Juniper Networks
 Arista Networks

 Edgecore Networks Corporation	5%
 Other	15%

List of members (39 routers over 31 ASNs):

ASN	Description	IPv4	IPv6	Speed
  <a href="#">AS400798</a>	Pittsburgh Internet Exchange	206.71.141.6	2001:504:77::6	100 Gbps
   <a href="#">AS400798</a>	Pittsburgh Internet Exchange	206.71.141.7	2001:504:77::7	100 Gbps
   <a href="#">AS212232</a>	bgp.tools Route Collector	206.71.141.9	2001:504:77::9	10 Gbps
   <a href="#">AS20326</a>	TeraSwitch Networks Inc.	206.71.141.10	2001:504:77::10	100 Gbps
   <a href="#">AS13335</a>	Cloudflare, Inc	206.71.141.11	2001:504:77::11	10 Gbps

View

Showing routes on "PIT-IX" route servers that point to the next hop of 206.71.141.6, 2001:504:77::6.

Session	Prefix	BGP Path
PIT-IX-RS1-4	<a href="#">23.143.152.0/24</a>	 <a href="#">AS30365</a>  <a href="#">AS400798</a>
PIT-IX-RS1-6	<a href="#">2602:faaa::/36</a>	 <a href="#">AS30365</a>  <a href="#">AS400798</a>
PIT-IX-RS2-4	<a href="#">23.143.152.0/24</a>	 <a href="#">AS30365</a>  <a href="#">AS400798</a>
PIT-IX-RS2-6	<a href="#">2602:faaa::/36</a>	 <a href="#">AS30365</a>  <a href="#">AS400798</a>

[Click here to go back](#)

[View](#)[Edit](#)[Looking Glass](#)[Communities](#)[Cone](#)

# Deutsche Telekom AG

AS Number 3320

[BGP](#)[RIPE Atlas](#)

There are 392 [RIPE Atlas Probes](#) on this ASN.

Select up to 10 probes at random

Traceroute to:

185.230.223.150

Request Traceroute

Measurement running, waiting for results...



## Request Traceroute

RIPE Atlas Link: <https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/102650027/#general>

Start: 2025-05-10T20:01:31Z (Probe: [53254](#))

HOST: 93.234.20.167

		Loss%	Last
1.	AS???	192.168.200.1	0.0% 3.3
2.	AS3320	p3e9bf765.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.....	0.0% 2.4
3.	AS3320	62.154.4.230	0.0% 10.3
4.	AS3320	62.157.250.38	0.0% 9.9
5.	AS6762	195.22.209.198	0.0% 22.6
6.	AS6762	seabone-core1-thn.lon.as3170.n	0.0% 25.8
7.	AS3170	et-0-0-2.core1-thn.lon.as3170.	0.0% 25.8
8.	AS3170	et-0-0-1.core2-ixn.lon.as3170.	0.0% 25.4
9.	AS???	???	100% 0
10.	AS206924	2com8.b621.net.	0.0% 24.4
11.	AS206924	bgp.tools.	0.0% 25.4

Start: 2025-05-10T20:01:31Z (Probe: [53254](#))

[View](#)[Edit](#)[Looking Glass](#)[Communities](#)[Cone](#)

# Deutsche Telekom AG

AS Number 3320

[BGP](#)[RIPE Atlas](#)

There are 392 [RIPE Atlas Probes](#) on this ASN.

Select up to 10 probes at random

Traceroute to:

185.230.223.150

Request Traceroute

Measurement running, waiting for results...



Available on most  
ASNs with Atlas  
Probes of BGP  
sessions

## Request Traceroute

RIPE Atlas Link: <https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/102650027/#general>

Start: 2025-05-10T20:01:31Z (Probe: [53254](#))

HOST: 93.234.20.167

		Loss%	Last
1.	AS??? 192.168.200.1	0.0%	3.3
2.	AS3320 p3e9bf765.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.....	0.0%	2.4
3.	AS3320 62.154.4.230	0.0%	10.3
4.	AS3320 62.157.250.38	0.0%	9.9
5.	AS6762 195.22.209.198	0.0%	22.6
6.	AS6762 seabone-core1-thn.lon.as3170.n.....	0.0%	25.8
7.	AS3170 et-0-0-2.core1-thn.lon.as3170.....	0.0%	25.8
8.	AS3170 et-0-0-1.core2-ixn.lon.as3170.....	0.0%	25.4
9.	AS??? ???	100%	0
10.	AS206924 2com8.b621.net.....	0.0%	24.4
11.	AS206924 bgp.tools.....	0.0%	25.4



# AS-SET Views

- Including size estimation in prefixes and ASNs
- Just search for the AS-SET name, or find their PeeringDB one on the "IX" tab

## AS13335:AS-CLOUDFLARE

Database **ARIN**

Full Name **AS13335:AS-CLOUDFLARE**

Overview

Reverse

Raw


Total Size

**1310 ASNs**

**74584 v4 Prefixes**

**46467 v6 Prefixes**

### Members:

-	Member	ASN Count/Whois Name	v4 Count	v6 Count
ARIN	<a href="#">AS13335:AS-CUSTOMERS</a>	1305	71085	<b>16271</b>
	<a href="#">AS13335</a>	Cloudflare, Inc.	3115	<b>30145</b>
	<a href="#">AS132892</a>	Cloudflare, Inc.	34	20
	<a href="#">AS133877</a>	Cloudflare, Inc.	0	0
	<a href="#">AS202623</a>	Cloudflare Inc	9	10
	<a href="#">AS209242</a>	Cloudflare BYOIP Customers	483	38
	<a href="#">AS394536</a>	Cloudflare, Inc.	1	2

# You may now know how to

- Quickly check what providers are in use (for inbound traffic) for yours and other networks
- Spot route leaks and understand why they sometimes happen
- Browse around for Internet Exchanges and who is on them, what they are advertising to route servers
- Find out what DNS entries are behind a BGP prefix
- What "Upstreams" / "Downstreams" mean in the context of things like bgp.tools, and how they are calculated

# Thank you, Questions?

If you are shy, Don't worry!

I will be here until Friday morning, just find me walking around and I am happy to explain things! You can also email me on

[admin@bgp.tools](mailto:admin@bgp.tools)